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his paper argues that the 
January 2006 gas cut off in the 
Ukraine encouraged EU policy-
makers and the media to focus on the 
wrong Russian gas issue. The core 
issue for the EU is not the threat of a 
politically motivated gas cut off. 
Rather it is the prospect of Russia, 
through lack of investment, not being 
able to produce enough gas to cover 
Russian and EU demands. The paper 
considers the extent of the likely gas 
deficit and determines that if no action 
is taken by 2010 the EU may be facing 
a deficit close to or even beyond its 
current Russian gas import level. The 
damaging consequences of such a 
deficit are then outlined for Russia, the 
Central and Eastern European 
member states and the older Western 
EU member states. The paper goes on 
to argue that an over-arching 
liberalised market structure needs to be 
built in both Russia and the EU, 
underpinned by the strong investor 
protection provisions of the Energy 
Charter Treaty. The paper concludes 
by examining the short- and longer-
term measures that can be deployed to 
close the deficit. 
Introduction 
The dispute between Russia and the 
Ukraine in January 2006 over gas prices 
and the subsequent temporary cut off in 
supplies caused political shockwaves 
across Europe.
1 It focussed questions 
concerning Russian gas supplies around 
the issue of whether Russia may cut off 
gas supplies in the future for political 
reasons.
2 This was unfortunate because 
                                                  
1 Stern, The Gazprom-Ukraine Gas Dispute of 
January/February 2006, presentation IEA 
Paris, June 2006.  
2 As Larsson points out while Russia has until 
recently been a reliable supplier to Western 
Europe since the gas first flowed West in 1968 
the crisis has sorely misled policy-
makers as to the true threat to Russian 
gas supplies to the European Union: 
The decline in supply from the Russian 
gas fields is likely to make it 
increasingly difficult for Gazprom to 
honour its supply contracts to customers 
leading to a significant supply crisis 
across Russia, the CIS and the EU 
member states. 
The gas deficit
3 identified by the IEA
4 
and Vladimir Milov,
5 President of the 
Moscow-based Institute of Energy 
Policy is already with us and is likely to 
grow to above 126 billion cubic metres 
                                                         
the same cannot be said of Eastern Europe. 
Larsson identifies 40 Russian cut offs in the 
Central and Eastern Europe states since the 
end of the Soviet Union. Larsson, Russia’s 
Energy Policy Security Dimensions and 
Russia’s Reliability as an Energy Supplier, 
FOI (Swedish Defence Research Agency), 14, 
2006. 
3 The gas deficit as discussed in this paper is 
based on Milov et al.’s analysis in their recent 
paper. That is Gazprom’s supply of gas plus 
that of the Russian independents and Central 
Asian gas supplies matched against future 
demand, which is based on Gazprom’s own 
figures of planned growth. Milov, Coburn & 
Danchenko,  Russian Energy Policy 1992-
2005, Eurasian Geography & Economics, 285-
313, 304, 2006. 
4 International Energy Agency, Optimising 
Russian Natural Gas: Reform and Climate 
Policy, 2006). 
5 Milov et al., op. cit. Milov is also a former 
Deputy Energy Minister of the Russian 
Federation. The website of the Institute of 
Energy Policy is 
http://www.energypolicy.ru/eindex.php 
(bcm) by 2010.
6 To put this figure in 
context current Russian exports to non-
FSU Europe are approximately 
150bcm.
7 There are also strong grounds 
for believing that the deficit by 2010 
may be significantly greater than 
126bcm. At first sight it appears 
counter-intuitive that the country with 
the world’s largest proven reserves of 
gas 47 trillion cubic metres (tcm) can 
possibly be running short of gas.
8 
However, as explained below a number 
of factors, not least the running off of 
existing fields and the lack of 
investment in new fields, together with 
a Soviet approach to running the 
Russian gas market have created the 
coming shortage. As Milov says: 
Oil and gas industries are on the 
brink of a crisis evident in the 
inability to sustain medium term 
production growth. A problem that 
creates one of the most urgent and 
pressing challenges for energy 
policy…….the production crisis is 
most acute in the gas industry.
9 
                                                  
6 Milov et al., op. cit., 305. 
7 Stern, The Future of Russian Gas and 
Gazprom, OUP, 110, 2006. Stern gives an 
extensive state by state breakdown of 2004 
export figures, with approximately 93 bcm 
going to Greece, Finland, Austria, France, 
Italy, Germany and the Netherlands and a 
further 29bcm going to Hungary, Poland, 
Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
8 IEA, op. cit., 15. 
9 Milov et al., op. cit., 303. 
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This paper examines the reasons for the 
gas deficit and analyses the figures 
presented by Milov and the IEA. It also 
looks at the serious consequences of a 
gas shortage for Russia; the Eastern and 
Central European EU member states 
who depend on Russian gas and 
Germany, the greatest dependent 
amongst the Western member states
10 
and Russia’s biggest European 
investor.
11 The paper examines the 
over-arching failure to liberalise in the 
EU and Russian energy markets as a 
significant factor affecting the deficit 
problem before considering first the 
principal immediate and then the 
longer-term solutions. Finally, the paper 
argues that although there is mutual 
dependency between Russia and the 
EU, the EU is by no means as 
dependent on Russia as Russia is on the 
EU. However, for the EU to be able to 
minimise its dependency it has to act 
collectively when negotiating on energy 
matters with Russia.  
The paper is divided into five parts. Part 
two analyses the reasons for and 
potential extent of the gas deficit; part 
three looks at the consequences of the 
gas deficit and part four some solutions, 
including the strategic context and both 
shorter- and longer-term solutions to the 
deficit problem. Part five offers a 
conclusion. 
The Coming of the Gas 
Deficit 
At first sight it does appear inexplicable 
that Russia could suffer any gas supply 
deficit given its prodigious reserves of 
47 tcm representing 26% of global 
proven reserves. However, during this 
decade the supply deficit has become 
increasingly acute and threatens to 
become even more so around 2010. The 
gas deficit arises from two interlocking 
problems. First, the run off from the 
existing super giant fields in the Nadym 
Pur Taz (NPT) region and second the 
lack of domestic investment by 
Gazprom in new fields. Gazprom has 
unfortunately not opened up any new 
supergiant fields apart from 
Zapolyarnoye which has temporarily 
reduced the impact of the decline of the 
NPT fields.
12  
                                                  
10 Stern, The Future of Russian Gas, ibid., 110. 
11 FDI Magazine, January 2005. 
12 IEA, op. cit., 27. 
It also appears puzzling as to why 
Gazprom has not invested in new fields. 
NPT and even Zapolyarnoye are Soviet 
legacy projects, with high energy prices 
and the prospects of a running off of the 
NPT fields one would have thought 
Gazprom would have had the resources 
and would have put the necessary 
investment in place to develop new 
fields. However, there are a number of 
powerful reasons that militate against 
that investment. First, Gazprom itself is 
heavily in debt, following the purchase 
of Sibneft it carries $38 billion of 
debt.
13 It also appears to be the case that 
whenever Gazprom does have extra 
revenue it fritters it away in higher 
operating costs.
14 Second, the Russian 
financial system is weak and cannot 
provide financing on the scale necessary 
to develop supergiant gas fields.
15 The 
scale of the capital requirements are 
truly enormous. For example, the total 
bill for the development of the next 
supergiant field in Western Siberia, 
Yamal, is likely to be in the order of 
$70 billion.
16 Gazprom’s recent 
                                                  
13 Milov, The Power of Oil and Energy 
Insecurity, 13, January 2006. Some 
commentators may argue that a significant 
debt in part incurred by the acquisition of 
Sibneft can be carried by Gazprom because of 
the high level of its current revenues. The 
difficulty and key vulnerability for Gazprom is 
that in order to deliver reliable energy supplies 
to its foreign customers it has to be able year 
on year to invest significant amounts of capital 
into infrastructure and new fields. This is 
clearly much more difficult to deliver when 
the business carries so much debt. In the 
medium term the greater danger for Gazprom 
is that the level of revenue falls as a result of a 
fall in the oil price (most of its pricing in its 
supply contracts are linked to the oil price) 
creating a real cash crunch in the business. 
Investment projects would have to be delayed 
or cancelled adding to supply problems. 
14 Milov, ibid., 10. In 2004, Gazprom reported 
a $10 billion increase in operating expenses on 
the back of rising energy prices. 
15 Kotin, Its Gogol Again, 17 James A Baker 
III Institute for Public Policy, October 2004. 
Kotin argues that the country has no proper 
banking system and that while larger sums 
than $200 million could be raised in practice 
“when Russian citizens have real business to 
do they do it in New York or London”. 
16 Milov, Energy Insecurity, op. cit., 8. $70 
billion is the total lifetime cost of the project. 
However, a significant proportion of the 
capital will have to be spent upfront on 
preparing the fields and building the pipelines 
and compressor stations. It should also be 
noted that there are still questions concerning 
the viability of at least part of the Yamal field. 
It is unclear whether the harsh climate of the 
decision to develop the Shtokman field 
without a foreign partner will add 
significantly to these already heavy 
capital demands.
17 Thirdly, even where 
Gazprom invests, the investment is 
directed at foreign acquisitions and 
export infrastructure, not on building 
and refurbishing domestic pipelines and 
opening up new fields.
18 Fourthly, while 
firms such as BP may be willing to risk 
a few billion in the harsh and uncertain 
Russian business environment $70 
billion plus is more than most major 
energy firms even acting in consortia 
are able to contemplate, without much 
stronger protection of investor rights 
than Russian domestic law can currently 
provide.
19 This issue of investor rights 
has recently been given a very sharp 
edge by the behaviour of the Russian 
authorities in relation to Shell and 
Exxonmobil’s licences to explore and 
extract at Sakhalin.
20 The production 
sharing agreements made in the low 
energy price era of the early 1990s now 
appear to be able to be undermined by 
the Russian government because 
economic circumstances have changed. 
Unwillingness to comply with 
contractual arrangements is likely to act 
as a very significant deterrent to 
potential future investors. Fifthly, 
another concern for Western investors is 
that their rights to control an asset are 
limited by a 49% foreign shareholding 
rule.
21 Sixthly, by a wider hostility to 
FDI, which in practice forces Western 
                                                         
Yamal region means that at least some of the 
reserves are in fact inaccessible or only 
accessible at far too high a cost to be worth 
recovering. 
17  President Supports Shift on Shtokman, 
Moscow Times, 11 October 2006. 
18 IEA, op. cit., 29. The IEA criticises 
Gazprom on this point. In its view Gazprom 
needs to spend at least $11 billion annually on 
new production, pipelines and refurbishing 
pipes. Instead it spends almost exactly that on 
the North European Pipeline and foreign 
acquisitions. Stern similarly notes, “Gazprom 
investment plans for the next decade do not 
seem to be specifically targeted at slowing 
production decline in existing fields”. Stern, 
Future of Russian Gas, op. cit., 8. 
19 The confidence of investors have been 
recently shaken by the threat to the licences of 
Shell and BP in Sakhalin 2 and Kovykta fields. 
See respectively, The Times, Putin Takes Hard 
Line on Shell Sakhalin Dispute, 28 September 
and Financial Times, Gazprom Puts Pressure 
on TNK/BP 28
 September 2006. 
20 Russia Cancels Shell Permits for Sakhalin 2, 
Financial Times, 19 September 2006. 
21 Larsson, op. cit., 52. The Coming of the Russian Gas Deficit: Consequences and Solutions | 3 
shareholdings in Russian energy firms 
to accept on the whole much smaller 
percentages than 49%.
22 
The deficit is also widened by, given 
the circumstances, the extremely 
perverse decision of Gazprom to press 
on with both rural and urban 
gasification.
23 Gazprom is aiming at 
60% regional gasification by 2008 and 
is building 12,000km of new pipeline. 
The projected budget cost is $1.3 billion 
and will result in a further supply 
requirement of 9bcm. Despite the 
difficult supply circumstances Gazprom 
has even gone further than its current 
budget plans and has already spent $1 
billion on gasification alone in 2006.
24 
This suggests the new supply 
requirements will be nearer 20bcm 
rather than 9bcm by 2008.
25 A further 
problem which impacts on gas 
availability is that Russian compressors 
inefficient use gas to pump the gas 
along. The loss to the system is 
enormous. It is estimated by the IEA at 
42bcm.
26 Gas is also lost by virtue of 
the aging nature of much of the ‘Soviet 
legacy’ infrastructure. While Gazprom 
is now seeking to refurbish its Soviet 
era infrastructure it is open to question 
whether enough is really being spent on 
that infrastructure to radically reduce 
gas losses. 
As Stern points out that 58% of the 
pipes are more than twenty years old. In 
the harsh environments this 
infrastructure has to operate in there is 
real concern of gas leakages from the 
aging infrastructure. Calculations by 
VNIIgaz in 2002 suggest that the gas 
pipeline network as a whole is operating 
at 9% below its design capacity and that 
the greatest loss was in the central 
pipeline corridor was more than 12% 
                                                  
22 Larsson, op. cit., 62. 
23 One possible reason for the decision to push 
ahead with rural and urban gasification may be 
that gasification is a policy required by the 
Russian Federal administration. 
24 IEA, op. cit., 38. 
25 Traditionally far more gas was used for 
industry than for domestic use. Increasing 
domestic gasification makes it more difficult 
for Gazprom to protect gas supplies to 
domestic residential customers and foreign 
customers by cutting domestic industrial 
supply as the balance of demand moves in 
favour of residential gas supplies. 
26 IEA, op. cit., 36. As much as 8bcm could be 
shaved off this figure via efficiency measures. 
below capacity.
27 Stern also points out 
that “lack of profitability in the 
transmission system is a potentially 
significant obstacle to timely 
refurbishment of the network”.
28 Lack 
of profitability is likely to remain an 
issue so long as domestic gas prices 
remain so low in comparison to world 
prices. 
The consequences of this lack of 
investment are extremely serious as can 
be seen from Milov’s figures.
29 
  2004 2010 
Gazprom’s gas 
production
a 
545 550 
Gazprom’s export to 
Europe/CIS
b 
191 312
c 
Remaining volume for 
domestic customers 
354 238 
Russia’s domestic 
demand 
402
d 469
d 
Gap  69 231
d 
   202
e 
Gas deliveries from 
Central Asia
f 
 105 
Total gap    126 
   97
e 
a  Without new Yamal fields, optimistic 
forecast
30 
b Excluding Asian Exports 
c Includes 200bcm Europe &112 bcm to CIS 
d Probable scenario growth 4.3% 
e Reduced Scenario 2% per year 
f best possible scenario  
Note: As note c indicates, European demand is 
likely to increase by approximately 
50bcm in the 2004-2010 period. This 
demand increase is fuelled by closing 
down of nuclear reactors, greater 
European environmental regulation and 
reduction of own EU gas sources. 
These figures are supported by the IEA 
who estimate a decline of 20 bcm/y 
leading to a gap by 2015 of 200bcm 
based on current demand levels.
31 
It should be emphasised that Milov’s 
figures are conservative and optimistic. 
                                                  
27 Stern, The Future of Russian Gas, op. cit., 
36. 
28 Stern, The Future of Russian Gas, op. cit., 
37. 
29 Milov et al., op. cit., 305. 
30 It is estimated that Yamal has the greatest 
source of gas in the Western Siberian fields of 
145bcm/y when at full production. Milov et 
al., op. cit., 304. However, senior Gazprom 
officials have indicated that development will 
not commence until 2016 at the earliest. This 
explains the note a in Milov’s table and his 
exclusion of Yamal capacity. IEA, op. cit., 28. 
31 IEA, op. cit., 34. 
It assumes that Gazprom is able to 
maintain supply around 550bcm.
32 This 
may not in fact be the case for two 
reasons. First, accessing gas in smaller 
NPT fields while awaiting the next 
supergiant field, Yamal to come on 
stream may not be easy. As Stern points 
out, these smaller fields have higher 
production costs and require more 
complex processing.
33 Second, it is 
unclear how much of the proven 
remaining reserves of the existing 
supergiant NPT fields can be effectively 
and profitably extracted. Factors that 
may affect production include damage 
caused by over-production during the 
Soviet period and that production of the 
remaining gas may prove very 
expensive.
34  
Lack of alternative supplies to the NPT 
fields is not the only problem facing 
Russian gas supplies. It is also open to 
question how effective is Gazprom’s 
rescue strategy: Central Asian gas. 
Gazprom hopes to rescue itself from the 
supply gap by purchasing gas from 
Central Asia. There is more than a hint 
of desperation in the plan of the world’s 
largest holder of gas reserves to actually 
buy gas. The sense of the Central Asian 
plan being a desperate endeavour is 
reinforced when the true gas capacities 
of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan are examined in detail. The 
plan envisages a rise in gas supplies 
from the Central Asian states, and 
principally Turkmenistan of 6bcm in 
2004 rising to 60bcm then 80bcm by 
2009, with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
providing the balance of 25bcm.
35 On 
the facts such capacity deliveries look 
hopelessly unrealistic. There are a range 
of difficulties spotted by the IEA. These 
range from the prospect of 
Turkmenistan with very little 
investment over the last decade 
doubling its gas production within a few 
                                                  
32 Stern suggests that the position may be 
slightly worse in 2010 with supply reaching 
only 530bcm, but considerably worsening to 
340bcm by 2020 as decline accelerates as the 
three main fields are depleted. Stern, The 
Future of Russian Gas, op. cit., 33. 
33 Costs are driven up by a large number of 
smaller fields as well as the fact that these 
fields are not dry gas but involve production of 
liquids and therefore ‘more complex 
processing and transportation’. Stern, The 
Future of Russian Gas, op. cit., 58. 
34 Stern, The Future of Russian Gas, op. cit., 
33-34. 
35 IEA, op. cit., 31. 4 | Alan Riley 
years to the difficulty of using the 
Central Asian Centre (CAC) pipeline 
which again has not been maintained in 
good order and is now operating at 
significantly below capacity.
36 On the 
other side of the border, there are also 
questions as to the capacity of the 
Russian pipeline system to put through 
the Central Asian gas.
37 Milov’s figures 
also do not appear to take account of 
Gazprom’s rapid domestic gasification 
which is increasing domestic demand 
nor the loss of gas to pump the rest of 
the supply through the system. These 
last two features alone could add an 
additional 60bcm onto supply demands. 
It is not all bleak. One potentially bright 
spot is that the Russian gas 
independents attracted by increasing 
domestic prices may be able to fill some 
of the gap. The National Energy 
Strategy suggests that they will only 
provide 20% of supply by 2020 as 
opposed to 13% today. However, the 
IEA working from independent gas 
company projections estimates that the 
true figure as early as 2015 could be 
40% that is 260-290bcm.
38 However, 
Stern in a detailed analysis of the 
Russian gas independents suggests that 
only Novatek and possibly TNK/BP are 
likely to be in a position to significantly 
add to gas supplies. The gas generating 
oil companies, such as Rosneft 
ambitions in the gas sector are likely to 
be limited by the extent of their reserves 
and the availability of capital and the 
prospect of greater profitability in the 
oil sector.
39 He believes that the more 
conservative approach of the Russian 
Energy Strategy 2003 is therefore 
essentially correct with a production 
                                                  
36 IEA, op. cit., 31. The overall capacity of the 
CAC is 90bcm/y but because of lack of 
maintenance the maximum capacity is 
50bcm/y. The costs of refurbishment are likely 
to be significant; the IEA questions the $2 
billion and $1billion projections for just the 
Kazak and Uzbek part of the pipelines as 
likely to be too low. There are also continuing 
pricing disputes between Russia and 
Turkmenistan.  
37 IEA, op. cit., 32. There are also a number of 
questions concerning the ability of the Russian 
pipeline system to function effectively to take 
Central Asian gas. Russian parts of the 
pipeline system suffer from reduced capacity. 
The system may be operating at 60bcm below 
capacity. 
38 IEA, op. cit., 32. 
39 Stern, The Future of Russian Gas, op. cit., 
23. 
figure of 120-135bcm perhaps up to 
150bcm by 2015.
40 
Furthermore, whatever level of supply 
is available from the independents the 
delivery of that gas depends on gas 
independents access to capital and 
confidence that they will obtain 
significant access to Gazprom’s pipe 
network. Both assumptions are open to 
question. Will Gazprom permit 
significant use of its pipeline by 
independents and the onsale of 
independent gas to foreign purchasers? 
Significant independent access to the 
Gazprom’s network would undermine 
the whole concept of a Kremlin directed 
vertically integrated energy giant that 
has been built up during the second 
Putin administration. An alternative 
scenario to increasing access by gas 
independents to the network is that 
access will in fact be limited and 
consequently capital to develop their 
business dries up. Gazprom then 
acquires more and more independents to 
stem the loss of supply from its own 
fields as supply decline accelerates. In 
such a scenario it is doubtful whether 
weakened independents newly acquired 
by Gazprom will be as successful in 
maintaining high production levels.
41 
Another alternative source of gas to 
plug the deficit is gas from the 
Shtokman field. Gazprom has 
announced that it will be using gas from 
that field for deliveries via the North 
European Pipeline (NEP) into the EU 
Shtokman looks at first sight like a 
potential solution to any deficit 
problem. The Shtokman field is a 
supergiant field of 3.7tcm.
42 However, 
on closer examination developing that 
field is very problematic. In the first 
place, as explained above, given the 
other capital demands on Gazprom it is 
open to question how Gazprom is going 
to be able to put in place the necessary 
capital for Shtokman, for the other 
fields it needs to develop and for 
refurbishing the existing infrastructure 
as well. Secondly, Gazprom neither has 
                                                  
40 Stern The Future of Russian Gas, op. cit., 
58. 
41 As Milov points out, Gazprom is one of the 
most inefficient energy companies on the 
planet. Its return on total assets ratio is not far 
off that of Pemex, globally the most inefficient 
energy company. Milov, Russian Energy 
Sector and its International Reputation, Tokyo 
Presentation, 20, March 2005.  
42 IEA, op. cit., 28. 
the technology nor the experience of 
delivering unprocessed gas from a 
seabed to an online facility for 
processing. In fact, only Statoil has 
experience of such a long-distance 
under-water pipeline as part of their 
Snovit project. The pipeline is only 
120km and is not yet completed, and 
when completed it will be the longest 
such pipeline in existence. The pipeline 
that Gazprom proposes to build on its 
own will be several times the length of 
the Snovit pipeline at 500km.
43 The 
likelihood is that any gas from the 
Shtokman field will only start flowing 
into the NEP around the middle of the 
next decade at the earliest. Far too late 
to deal with the deficit crunch that 
Milov predicts around 2010. 
With so many variables and insufficient 
information it is difficult to provide a 
precise account of how great the gas 
deficit is likely to be by 2010. What can 
be said is that Russia and the EU will be 
lucky to have a deficit of only 126bcm. 
There must be concern that Gazprom 
will deliver less than 550bcm as a result 
of inadequate development of the 
smaller NPT fields, and inability to 
access all remaining resources of the 
NPT supergiants combined with the 
delay in opening Yamal. In addition, the 
majority of the scale of the proposed 
Central Asian gas supply is likely to be 
either unreachable because of defective 
pipelines or is non-existent. Until 2006 
Turkmenistan supplied Ukraine, via the 
Russian pipeline, 36bcm. A figure 
around this level is probably more 
likely than the 80bcm under the 
Russian-Turkmenistan agreement. This 
is assuming no pricing disputes disrupt 
supplies, there is no supply diversion 
and there is no further decline in 
pipelines capacity. Additional gas from 
the independents may prove one means 
of plugging the deficit. However, 
whether independents have sufficient 
gas and whether Gazprom will permit 
them to use its network is open to 
question. It is reasonable to conclude 
therefore that the gas deficit may well 
be closer to 200bcm than 126bcm by 
2010.  
There are also additional reasons for 
believing that the deficit may be 
heading for the upper end of the 
                                                  
43 “Go it alone tactics from Gazprom leave 
Experts Divided”, Financial Times, 11 
October 2006. The Coming of the Russian Gas Deficit: Consequences and Solutions | 5 
projections. In the winter of 2005/2006 
several EU member states both in the 
Eastern and Western parts of the Union 
did not receive their full contractual 
supplies of Russian gas.
44 I t  i s  a l s o  
understood that in Russia itself 
industrial suppliers did not receive their 
full contractual supplies either. 
Incredibly, this June according to 
Anatoli Chubais, CEO of UES Russia’s 
electric power monopoly gas 
restrictions were imposed in UES gas 
power stations.
45 As Milov says “gas 
shortage is not a prospect it is already 
here”.
46 
Consequences 
The potential consequences of a 
significant gas deficit are likely to be 
particularly severe for Russia, the 
Central and Eastern European states and 
Germany.  
Russia is the most vulnerable to 
significant gas shortages. If even just 
foreign gas consumption is cut and 
Russian consumption is protected 
Russia faces a cut in overseas earnings, 
and as Gazprom alone provides 
approximately 20% of Federal tax 
receipts, cuts in tax revenue.
47 The 
Russian state could then face significant 
problems in affording additional 
benefits granted during the Putin years, 
such as enhanced pensions.
48 If the gas 
deficit is more significant, then cuts are 
likely to fall disproportionately on 
industry. Unfortunately Russian 
industry (together with that of Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan) is the most energy-
inefficient in the world hence gas 
shortages could inflict significant 
                                                  
44 For clarification, the author is not here 
referring to politically motivated cut-offs but 
rather non-deliveries because of shortages. 
45 Moscow-Russia is currently facing a gas 
shortage, Anatoli Chubais, chief executive of 
Russia's electric power monopoly SEU[UES], 
said here Tuesday: “There is a real gas deficit 
in the country”, Chubais said of Russia, which 
holds the largest gas reserves of any country in 
the world. “In the month of June restrictions 
were imposed on the use of gas in our power 
plants”, he said in remarks on the sidelines of 
an investors’ conference. Chubais stressed the 
fact that the restrictions came in June rather 
than in the middle of a bitter winter. FIN 24, 
20 June 2006. 
46 Milov, Interview, Economies in Transition 
(World Bank), 13, April-June 2006. 
47 Stern, Gazprom, op. cit., 56. 
48 Milov, Energy Insecurity, op. cit., 4. 
damage on Russian industry.
49 To make 
matters worse, aside from gas exports, 
oil, minerals and metals are the other 
three principal foreign exchange earners 
and all rely heavily on gas or electricity 
generated by gas.
50 The prospect of a 
serious gas deficit is extremely 
dangerous for Russia with the economy 
and the state’s legitimacy under threat 
from what would become a vicious 
downward spiral which would 
undermine the economic gains that have 
been made since 1999. 
Most Central and Eastern European 
countries are heavily dependent on 
Russian gas.
51 A non-temporary 
shortage could throw many CEECs into 
considerable difficulty both in respect 
of industrial production and in terms of 
the comfort and safety of their peoples. 
In addition to personal discomfort and 
immediate economic disruption very 
high energy prices generated by the 
shortage could inflict significant 
economic damage on CEECs’ 
economies, including delaying entry to 
the Euro and slowing growth. 
However, from a European strategic 
economic viewpoint, the most 
dangerous consequence of significant 
gas shortages does not lie in Central and 
Eastern Europe, but in Germany. If 
there are significant Russian gas 
shortages to the Germany economy, the 
Union’s largest, such shortages could 
cause widespread economic disruption 
across the Union.
52 The sharp edge to 
Germany’s predicament is caused by 
the economic reality that the gas deficit 
is likely to hit well before the NEP 
comes into operation and Shtokman gas 
comes on stream. As a result any gas 
shortage, whatever the formal 
contractual position, will hit the most 
westerly EU member states receiving 
Russian gas first and hardest, and 
Germany as the biggest Western 
recipient hardest of all.
53 In addition, for 
                                                  
49 Milov et al., op. cit., 288. 
50 IEA, op. cit., 27. Approximately 70% of 
thermal electricity generated by gas in 2004. 
51 See for example the European Commission 
report Long Term Gas Security in an Enlarged 
Europe  (December 2003). Particularly the 
position of Poland, 94 and following. 
52 According to the Altantic Review the 
current level of German gas dependency on 
Russia is 37%, Atlantic Review, April 2006. 
53 Because the NEP is very unlikely to be in 
place before the deficit becomes critical the 
only transport mechanism available for 
Germany, the largest European investor 
in Russia there is also the prospect of a 
double whammy of curtailed gas 
supplies and a fall in the value of 
German foreign investments as the 
Russian economy contracts in the face 
of such gas shortages.  
The prospect of gas shortages in 
Germany underscores the danger of 
individual member states seeking to 
come to bilateral arrangements with 
Russia. In essence, Germany has made 
a major strategic error. It has made 
itself heavily dependent on Russian gas 
without having the corresponding 
power to require its Russian partner to 
take steps such as liberalising its own 
markets; permitting free flow of foreign 
capital and ensuring the protection of 
property rights of investors that would 
ensure that that gas is available and will 
be delivered. 
Solutions 
Writing in October 2006, the EU and 
Russia still have time to minimise the 
impact of the gas deficit forecast by 
Milov and the IEA to become acute by 
2010. Below, the author sets out a 
number of short- and medium-term 
measures by which the deficit can be 
tackled. However, before these 
measures are discussed it is necessary to 
consider the fundamental strategic shift 
that is required both of the Russians and 
the European Union to tackle the 
deficit. Russian energy protectionism 
needs to be recognised in Moscow for 
the damage that it is inflicting on 
fundamental Russian interests. Equally, 
the EU member states have to recognise 
that their parallel energy protectionism 
fails to provide effective energy security 
for the EU states either. Both the EU 
and Russia need to undertake a major 
strategic shift in the direction of market 
liberalisation to create a single EU-
Russia wide energy market. 
                                                         
Russian gas is the East to West pipeline 
system running through Poland and Ukraine 
and on into Western Europe. If a significant 
gas shortage develops the transit states are 
very unlikely to be willing to permit gas 
westwards without first taking the gas they 
require for themselves. Hence in any serious 
shortage situation it is the most westerly EU 
member states who ordinarily receive Russian 
gas who are likely to be hit the hardest by any 
deficit. 6 | Alan Riley 
The current Kremlin administration 
fails to understand and accept that a 
Soviet style centralised quasi-ministry, 
which seeks to suppress competition 
and restrict foreign investment will take 
Russia on the path to gas deficit hell.
54 
It would appear that the Kremlin 
administration believes that it is 
protecting its greatest strategic asset: its 
gas industry from predatory foreigners 
and oligarchs. Unfortunately for the 
Kremlin what it is in fact doing is 
suffocating its gas industry, reducing its 
competitiveness and starving it of 
investment and ultimately threatening 
one of its principal sources of revenue. 
As British Labour MP Denis McShane 
has pointed out when it comes to statist 
and anti-market behaviour, some EU 
member states have been more 
Putinesque than Putin.
55 Although the 
EU talks a lot about liberalisation and in 
fact encourages Russia to open up its 
own energy markets, in practice many 
EU member states are running their 
own damaging protectionist energy 
regimes. Aside from the United 
Kingdom and to a degree the 
Scandinavian and Dutch, most member 
states run managed market systems not 
entirely dissimilar to the Russian 
system. The national energy company 
organised long term supply contracts 
with usually foreign suppliers, such as 
Gazprom. The national energy company 
then controlled the supply and usually 
had significant control of both the 
transmission system and much if not all 
of the supply contracts to customers, 
sometimes down to the retail level.  
While such managed markets may well 
give a false sense of security significant 
costs are also passed on to consumers. 
There is little choice and very little 
competition and a strong incentive to 
corporate inefficiency and misallocation 
of capital. In addition, such markets 
limit energy security as they tend to be 
limited to an individual national 
                                                  
54 What is surprising about this is that in the oil 
sector a far more open attitude to liberalisation 
has actually delivered high levels of 
production and significant foreign investment. 
Gas and oil provide almost a control test of 
how not to do it and how to do it. However, 
since the fall of Yukos both liberalisation and 
production have stalled. Milov, et al, op cit 
286. 
55 Note of the author of intervention by Mr 
McShane in the Energy Security Hearings 
October 3
rd 2006, Council of Europe, 
Strasbourg. 
territory. It is true that the EU had 
enacted a number of liberalisation 
directives in the energy sector to force 
through market liberalisation. However, 
the member states and energy 
incumbents successfully frustrated the 
liberalisation programme.  
At first therefore it looks as if any 
strategic shift toward liberalised and 
open markets in Russia and the EU 
which would provide the most positive 
context in which the gas deficit could be 
tackled is unlikely. However, there are a 
number of growing powerful realities 
that could provide the basis for a 
strategic shift in both Brussels and 
Moscow. The most immediate powerful 
reality is the facts on the ground. As 
Milov points out above, the gas deficit 
is already here. There have been gas 
cuts this summer in Russia; last winter a 
number of EU member states did not 
receive their contractual supplies of 
Russian gas. Winter by winter as we 
approach 2010 the gas deficit will 
widen, creating stress in the energy 
markets, economic disruption and 
raising political fears in many European 
capitals. In such a context policy-
makers both in Moscow and Brussels 
are likely to far more willing to 
contemplate radical action in their 
energy markets. 
A second major factor is that although 
the EU has not been practising what it 
preaches on energy liberalisation, the 
Commission’s most powerful 
department, DG Competition is now 
looking to open up EU energy markets. 
In March, DG Competition published a 
Preliminary Report on the state of EU 
energy markets.
56 The report reads like 
a charge sheet against domestic energy 
incumbents and the member states for 
failure to liberalise the energy markets. 
Gross market partioning, foreclosure of 
markets, denial of access to new 
entrants and flagrant violation of 
Community legislation.  
Under the leadership of Ms Kroes, the 
Commissioner for Competition, DG 
Competition is beginning to bring 
pressure to bear on the energy 
incumbents to comply both with 
Community liberalisation legislation 
and the competition rules. Raids have 
taken place on major incumbents and 
prosecutions are likely to follow. Ms 
                                                  
56European Commission, Energy Sector 
Inquiry Preliminary Report (February 2006). 
Kroes may well use her formal powers 
to the maximum to open up the EU’s 
energy markets-if necessary by forcing 
ownership unbundling under Article 
86(3) of the EC Treaty.
57  
Hence by virtue of action by DG 
Competition at least half of the EU-
Russia market is likely to be liberalised 
in the coming years. However, this EU 
liberalisation has knock-on effects on 
the Russian market. In the first place, it 
is unlikely that Ms Kroes and DG 
Competition will be content with 
tackling the downstream players in the 
EU market. DG Competition is likely to 
go upstream as well to investigate the 
energy producers in the gas sector. 
There are a number of issues in relation 
to gas producers. These include 
questions concerning cartelisation, 
operation of long-term supply contracts, 
destination clauses and steps towards 
vertical integration. Gazprom as the 
most powerful energy company 
operating in the EU would be likely to 
be at the centre of any upstream 
investigation. 
Secondly, a liberalised EU market 
would give Gazprom and other Russian 
energy majors considerably freer rein to 
acquire significant parts of the EU 
energy infrastructure and supply 
system. In such circumstances the 
reciprocity issue becomes a lot sharper. 
The EU member states are not 
unreasonably likely to ask why Russia 
should have access to the energy assets 
of a newly liberalised EU energy 
market, if Russia does not grant 
equivalent access to its own market. 
Gazprom, allowed to roam freely across 
the liberalised EU energy markets could 
for instance cut out the gas middlemen 
                                                  
57 Article 86(3) of the EC Treaty is the only 
provision in the Treaty that permits the 
Commission to take direct legislative action 
without the consent of the Parliament or 
Council. Under Sir Leon Brittan (as he then 
was) DG Competition used Article 86(3) to 
require Member States to break open a number 
of utility markets most notable of which was 
telecommunications. In the gas sector the most 
effective liberalisation step would be to require 
the Member States to unbundle the ownership 
of the supply and transmission companies. 
This it is argued is a vital step as it 
fundamentally changes the industry dynamics. 
A transmission owner not in possession of 
supply makes his profit principally from 
access charges. The more gas he puts through 
the pipes the more profit he makes-this 
incentive to maximise throughput should result 
in reduced prices for ultimate consumers.  The Coming of the Russian Gas Deficit: Consequences and Solutions | 7 
such as EON or Gaz de France and 
supply gas directly down the supply 
chain without the need for the 
participation of these historic energy 
incumbents. In such circumstances 
Russian firms are likely to find 
restrictions being placed on their access 
to the EU energy markets. 
Faced with gas shortages, EU energy 
liberalisation, antitrust action and the 
prospect of market access restrictions 
the Kremlin may well be willing to 
reconsider its current energy strategy. 
There is also a far more positive reason 
for Russia to embrace a more liberal 
energy strategy: Liberalisation in the 
right conditions could significantly 
enhance the market power of Russian 
energy majors. 
If with the advent of EU energy 
liberalisation Russia agrees to double 
liberalisation, full open market access 
of Russian energy markets, together 
with open EU energy markets, Russia’s 
energy majors can make significant 
gains. The Russian energy majors 
would obtain free and interrupted access 
to the energy markets of the EU. They 
would no longer fear that on grounds of 
lack of reciprocity, the EU member 
states might shut the door on them. 
Furthermore, in a fully liberalised 
market, Gazprom, Rosneft and Lukoil 
would be in a very powerful position. 
They would be able to lever their 
energy assets to obtain substantial 
Western capital and know-how and 
have the whole of the European market 
in which to operate within and build 
themselves up as Russian equivalents of 
Western energy majors.  
In a genuinely open EU and Russian 
energy market, the opportunities for 
Russian energy majors are truly 
immense. Russian energy companies 
would uniquely access to huge energy 
resources and have a rich domestic EU 
energy market close at hand with deep 
liquid capital markets. In addition to 
this world-beating combination, there 
are a number of European energy 
majors who could bring valuable skills, 
know-how and technology which could 
significantly enhance the effectiveness 
and reach of the Russian majors. In 
such a context, it is not unreasonable to 
see the creation of a BP Gazprom entity 
as the world’s leading energy company 
where the EU-Russia market is BP 
Gazprom’s massive home market. 
Double energy liberalisation would also 
provide a significant boost to closing 
the gas deficit. However, for 
liberalisation to work effectively it 
needs to be coupled with effective 
protection of property rights. Such 
entrenchment of property rights is vital 
to ensure that energy investors have the 
confidence to place the tens of billions 
of dollars in private capital that is 
necessary to fund the rebuilding of the 
Russian gas infrastructure and the 
opening up of new fields. The only way 
to do that is to ensure the Energy 
Charter Treaty is complied with by all 
parties, including Russia in full.  
In theory, the EU member states and 
Russia could sit down to draft a new 
energy treaty. However, there are two 
powerful arguments against any new 
energy treaty. First, any new energy 
treaty negotiations would almost 
certainly see state parties attempting to 
weaken investor protection. Particularly 
post the recent Sakhalin debacle weaker 
investor protection provisions are 
unlikely to make most potential 
investors more inclined to invest in 
Russia. Weaker investor protection 
provisions are likely to act as a market 
signal to at the least increase the cost of 
capital and reduce potential available 
capital. At the worst it could lead to a 
significant reduction in the number of 
investment houses who would be 
willing to put up the capital required to 
bring on new gas fields. Second, there is 
the issue of timing. Given the gas 
deficit problem time is of the essence. 
Neither Russia nor the EU have the time 
to spend several years negotiating the 
details of a new energy treaty. 
Investment needs to be encouraged and 
secured now and the ECT is the critical 
vehicle to secure that investment. 
In addition to liberalisation and the ECT 
there is a third element that is required, 
the creation of a common EU external 
voice on energy matters. The gas 
shortage and the German experience is 
a classic example of the failure of 
bilateralism. The EU speaking with one 
voice can negotiate effectively with 
Russia, ensure that double liberalisation 
is delivered, strong investor protection 
via the ECT to lever in capital into the 
Russian gas sector is honoured and that 
the massive all European energy market 
is effectively policed.
58 
Turning to the specific ‘fix’ questions 
of the gas deficit: The major difficulty 
Europe and Russia now face is that we 
are now less than three and a half years 
from 2010 – the point at which the gas 
deficit is likely to become acute. Hence, 
any strategy to deal with the deficit has 
to consider what steps can be taken 
rapidly to reduce the shortage. It is 
argued that since pipelines and new 
production take time, they should not be 
the first objects of any deficit reduction 
strategy. It is argued that in the first 
instance there should be a focus upon 
the energy efficiency, both by repairing 
leaking pipelines and putting in more 
efficient compressor stations to 
introducing a crash course of energy 
efficiency into extremely energy-
inefficient Russian industry.  
There is also the potential for the EU 
member states to source alternative gas 
supplies. It may be possible to source 
additional alternative gas supplies from 
Norway and Algeria and by LNG from 
further afield, such as Qatar. In 
particular, the development of three 
LNG gasification plants in the United 
Kingdom suggests that the UK may be 
able to close some of the deficit gap by 
importing LNG and then putting the gas 
through the UK interconnectors and into 
the continental pipe system.
59 Those 
LNG plants and the dual flow 
interconnectors between the UK and the 
continent are currently expanding 
capacity. The British should be 
encouraged to continue to expand 
capacity. Germany and the CEECs 
should look at routing gas from the UK 
LNG plants and Norway through 
expanded British interconnectors as a 
potential short-term measure to provide 
an alternative source of supply by 2010. 
In the longer-term, Western capital 
needs to flow into Russia to open up the 
                                                  
58 DG Competition and the Russian Anti-
Monopoly Agency would initially have to lead 
on policing the market. However, such a 
market may well require dual regulation by an 
EU and Russian. It is doubtful the member 
states could effectively seek to regulate its 
market with 25 different regulators while co-
ordinating its regulation of the EU-Russia 
market with a single Russian regulator.  
59 HLSC, The Commission’s Green Paper ‘A 
European Strategy for a Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy’, HL Paper 
224, paras 6-14, 2006. 8 | Alan Riley 
Yamal fields and refurbish the UGGS 
as well as develop Shtokman. A 
medium-term objective would be to 
start opening up the Ob and Taz bay 
fields as they are the most economic to 
open up being in shallow water and near 
fields in current production.
60 Gas 
supplies can also be increased by 
capturing a significant part of the 
60bcm that is flared every year
61 and 
potentially saving another 50bcm by 
introducing more modern and efficient 
gas turbines.
62  
Conclusions: Not Quite 
Mutual Dependency 
One of the strangest features of the 
debates on Russian gas supplies is that 
Russia is often portrayed in the Western 
media as an all-powerful energy 
superpower. It is not. In fact Russia and 
the EU are locked into a sort of mutual 
dependency. Russia’s pipelines all point 
in one direction, toward the European 
Union, and the EU is by far the richest 
market for Russian gas. The EU is the 
profitable market for Russian gas.
63 
                                                  
60 Stern, The Future of Russian Gas, op. cit., 
14-15. 
61 The official figures suggest that flaring only 
amounts to 15bcm/y. However, satellite 
images of Russia suggest that flaring is being 
carried on at much higher levels. The IEA 
believes the satellite images suggest that 
flaring is running at approximately 60bcm/y. 
IEA, op. cit., 21. 
62 IEA, op. cit. 
63 China most certainly is not it, 
notwithstanding the comments of President 
Putin on Monday 11 September 2006 in The 
Financial Times. He suggested that in 10-15 
years China will account for 30% of Russian 
oil and gas. This idea is almost as fanciful as 
buying gas from Central Asia. The key factor 
is the shape of the Chinese energy market. 
China has substantial quantities of cheap coal 
which provides a significant on-site competitor 
fuel product. It is as a result difficult to see 
how opening up new fields in Eastern Siberia 
and building expensive pipelines across 
Siberia will actually recover its costs. Worse 
still China has currently little use for gas. 
Current gas consumption is currently running 
at around 6% of total energy consumption and 
a new West-East pipeline is now bringing 
domestic supplies to the main population 
centres. Furthermore, just as in Russia China 
controls energy prices. Russia will not get a 
free market price for its gas – in which case 
once again does it make sense to open up new 
fields and build pipelines? China is likely to 
build up gas supplies from foreign sources but 
the most likely source is LNG tankers from 
Indonesia than from Russia, as Gazprom looks 
like it has been far too slow to move into this 
Equally, the EU is dependent on Russia. 
However, in this mutually dependent 
relationship the EU is not quite 
mutually dependent. Russia really has 
nowhere else to sell its gas and certainly 
no other such rich market. The EU by 
contrast has the financial capacity to 
make other arrangements. There is in 
fact plenty of gas in the world, it can be 
shipped in by LNG and alternative fuels 
to gas can be employed.
64 The EU 
acting in concert has the means to offer 
Russia a convincing powerful future for 
its gas industry. However, it also has the 
means, if Russia refuses the offer to 
walk away and to reduce Russia to the 
supplier of last resort. For the EU to be 
so effective and powerful it would have 
to act together and also appreciate the 
strength of its position in any 
negotiations with Russia. The tendency 
with the EU is for individual member 
states is to cut individual deals with 
Russia. However, the predicament of 
Germany, dependent on Russian gas 
supplies but without the power to 
reform Russia’s dysfunctional gas 
market-is a standing warning to all 
member states of the dangers of energy 
bilateralism. 
If the EU and its member states are 
going to be able to head off this 
looming energy crisis they need to learn 
to act collectively and will the 
institutional means for collective action. 
                                                         
market, and has neither the capital nor the 
technology. 
64 The 2003 report of the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the EU on Gas 
Liberalised Markets and Security of Supply is 
pertinent here. ‘The physical existence of gas 
is not a limiting factor. The global gas reserve 
is 50% higher than that of oil, at some 60 years 
of current demand. Gas resources have been 
much less explored than oil and much of the 
world’s reserves were found by organisations 
drilling [primarily] for oil. There will be 
significant growth in liquefied natural gas as 
costs fall. This will result in an increasingly 
global gas market with some growth in 
[market] liquidity’. HLSC, Gas Liberalised 
Markets, HL Paper 105, para 48, 2003.  About CEPS
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